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Inspired by the fact that people have diverse propensities to punish wrongdoers, we study a spatial public
goods game with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators. During the game, cooperators punish
defectors with class-specific probabilities and subsequently share the associated costs of sanctioning. We show
that in the presence of different punishing cooperators the highest level of public cooperation is always attainable
through a selection mechanism. Interestingly, the selection not necessarily favors the evolution of punishers who
would be able to prevail on their own against the defectors, nor does it always hinder the evolution of punishers
who would be unable to prevail on their own. Instead, the evolutionary success of punishing strategies depends
sensitively on their invasion velocities, which in turn reveals fascinating examples of both competition and
cooperation among them. Furthermore, we show that under favorable conditions, when punishment is not
strictly necessary for the maintenance of public cooperation, the less aggressive, mild form of sanctioning is
the sole victor of selection process. Our work reveals that natural strategy selection can not only promote, but
sometimes also hinder competition among prosocial strategies.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is vital for the maintenance of public goods in
human societies [1, 2]. But according to Darwin’s theory of
evolution, competition rather than cooperation ought to drive
our actions. The reconciliation of this theory with the fact that
cooperation is widespread in human societies, as well as with
the fact that it is much more common in nature as one might
expect, is one of the most persistent challenges in evolution-
ary biology and social sciences [3–6]. Past decades have seen
the paradigm of punishment rise as one of the more successful
strategies by means of which cooperation might be promoted
[7–15]. Indeed, punishment is also the principle tool of in-
stitutions in human societies for maintaining cooperation and
otherwise orderly behavior [16–19]. However, punishment is
costly, and as such it reduces the payoffs of both the defectors
as well as of those that exercise the punishment, hence yield-
ing an overall lower income and acting as a drain on social
welfare. Thus, understanding the emergence of costly punish-
ment is crucial for the evolution of cooperation [20–27].
While recent research confirms that punishment is often
motivated by negative personal emotions such as anger or
disgust [7, 28], Raihani and McAuliffe have shown also that
the decision to punish is often motivated with the aversion
of inequity in mind, rather than by the desire for reciprocity
[29]. Although prosocial punishment is widespread in nature
[30, 31], it is unlikely that cooperators are willing to commit
permanently to punishing wrongdoers. For that, the action is
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simply to costly, and hence some form of abstinence is likely,
also to avoid unwanted retaliation. Several research groups
have recently investigated these and related up and down sides
of punishment [27, 32–36]. For example, it was shown that
cooperators punish defectors selectively depending on their
current personal emotions, even if the number of defectors
is large [29]. More often than not, however, whether or not
to punish depends on the whiff of the moment and is thus
a fairly random event. Motivated by these observations, we
have recently shown that sharing the effort of punishment in a
probabilistic manner can significantly lower the vulnerability
of costly punishment and in fact help stabilize costly altruistic
strategies [27].
Here we drop the assumption that cooperators who do pun-
ish defectors do so uniformly at random. Instead, we account
for the diversity in punishment, taking into account the fact
that some individuals are more likely to punish, while others
punish only rarely. More specifically, we introduce different
threshold levels for punishment, which ultimately introduces
different classes of cooperators that punish defectors. The as-
sumption of diverse players is not just a realistic hypothesis,
but in general it is firmly established that it also has a decisive
impact on the evolution of public cooperation [37–40]. Mo-
tivated by this fact, we therefore study a spatial public goods
game with defectors and different types of punishing coop-
erators. While previously we have demonstrated the impor-
tance of randomly shared punishment [27], we here approach
a more realistic scenario by assuming that each type of coop-
erators will punish with a different probability. Our goal is to
determine whether a specific class of punishing cooperators
will be favored by natural selection, or whether despite the
competition among them synergistic effects will emerge. As
we will show, the evolution is governed by a counterintuitive
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2selection mechanism, depending further on the synergistic ef-
fects of cooperative behavior. However, before presenting the
main results in detail, we proceed by a more accurate descrip-
tion of the studied spatial public goods game with different
punishing strategies.
II. SPATIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAMEWITH DIVERSE
PUNISHMENT
We consider a population of individuals who play the pub-
lic goods game on a square lattice of size L×L with periodic
boundary conditions. We assume that the game is contested
between T classes of cooperators (C0, C1, . . ., CT−1) and de-
fectors (D). Independently of the class a cooperator belongs
to, it contributes an amount c to the common pool, while de-
fectors contribute nothing. After the sum of all contributions
in the group is multiplied by the enhancement factor r > 1,
the resulting amount is shared equally among all group mem-
bers.
Moreover, cooperators with strategy Ci (0 ≤ i ≤ T − 1)
choose to punish defectors with a probability i/(T − 1) if the
latter are present. As a result, each defector in the group
is punished with a fine α, while all the cooperators who
participated in the punishment equally shared the associated
costs. In particular, each punishing cooperator bears the cost
(n − nC)α/nP , where nC and nP are the number of coop-
erators and punishers in the group, respectively. We empha-
size that a cooperator who decides to punish bears the same
cost independently of the class it belongs to. Thus, here the
strategy s = Ci only determines how frequently a coopera-
tor is willing to punish defectors. Nevertheless, it is worth
pointing out that C0 never punish and thus correspond to tra-
ditional second-order free-riders because they enjoy the ben-
efits of punishment without contributing to it [41]. On the
other extreme, cooperators belonging to the CT−1 class pun-
ish always when defectors are present in the group. Since each
player on site xwith von Neumann neighborhood is a member
of five overlapping groups of size N = 5, in each generation
it participates in five public goods games and obtains its to-
tal payoff Px =
∑
j P
j
x , where P
j
x is the payoff gained from
group Gj .
Subsequently, a player x, having strategy sx, adopts the
strategy sy of a randomly chosen neighbor y with the prob-
ability
f(sx ← sy) = 1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/κ] , (1)
where κ denotes the amplitude of noise [42]. Without loosing
generality and to ensure continuity of this line of research [43]
we set κ = 0.5, meaning that it is very likely that the better
performing players will pass their strategy to their neighbors,
yet it is also possible that players will occasionally learn from
a less successful neighbor. To conclude the description of this
public good game, we would like to emphasize that differ-
ent Ci classes represent different strategies, as our goal is to
explore how the willingness to punish evolves at specific pa-
rameter values.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function of the
punishment fine α and the probability to punish p, as obtained for
a low multiplication factor r = 3.5 in the original model proposed
in [27], where a uniform probability to punish was assumed for all
cooperators. Note that both α and p have a non-monotonous impact
on the fraction of cooperators.
The model is studied by means of Monte Carlo simulations.
Initially, defectors randomly occupy half of the square lattice,
and each type of cooperators randomly 1/T of the rest of the
lattice. During one full Monte Carlo step (MCS), all individ-
uals in the population receive a chance once on average to
adopt another strategy. Depending on the proximity to phase
transition points and the typical size of emerging spatial pat-
terns, the linear system size was varied from L = 120 to 600
and the relaxation time was varied from 104 to 106 MCS to
ensure proper statistical accuracy. The reported fractions of
competing strategies were determined in the stationary state
when their average values became time-independent. Alter-
natively, we have averaged the outcomes over 20 − 100 in-
dependent runs when the system terminated into a uniform
absorbing state.
III. RESULTS
For the sake of comparison, we first present the fraction of
cooperators in dependence on the punishment fine α and the
probability to punish p at a low r value, as obtained in the orig-
inal probabilistic punishment model, where cooperators pun-
ish uniformly at random [27]. Figure 1 illustrates that the frac-
tion of cooperators first increases, reaches its maximum, but
then again decreases, as the values of α and p increase along
the diagonal on the p − α plane. Increasing one of these pa-
rameters, while the other is kept constant, returns to the same
observation. Both α and p thus have a non-monotonous im-
pact on the fraction of cooperators, which is closely related
with the fact that α characterizes not only the level of pun-
ishment but also its cost. Accordingly, too high values of α
involve too high costs stemming from the act of punishing. It
is worth pointing out that r = 3.5, which is used in Fig. 1, is
a relatively low value of the multiplication factor at which the
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Panel (a) shows the fraction of different co-
operator classes in the final state in dependence of α when they start
fighting with defectors simultaneously. Panel (c) shows an enlarged
part of panel (a) at low α values, when cooperation becomes dom-
inant over defection. To present the overall level of cooperation in
the population, the cumulative fraction of Ci strategies is also shown
(denoted by C). For comparison, in panel (b) we have also plotted
the resulting fraction of cooperator classes when they fight against
defectors individually. As in panel (c), panel (d) shows an enlarged
part of panel (b) at a specific interval of α. The multiplication factor
in all panels is r = 3.5.
non-monotonous dependence can still be observed. In com-
parison with the results obtained for larger values of r as used
in Ref. [27], however, the current plot features a significantly
narrower p region where full cooperation is possible when α is
sufficiently large. Similarly, there is a limited region of inter-
mediate α values where cooperators that punish severely can
beat defectors. Based on these observations, in the present
model we thus explore if there is an evolutionary selection
among different punishing strategies as they compete against
the defectors simultaneously, or if there is indeed cooperation
in the common goal to deter defectors.
For an intuitive overview, we set T = 6 and investigate how
the six types of punishing strategies compete and potentially
cooperate with each other in the presence of defectors. The
general conclusion, however, is robust and remains valid if
we use other values of T . Using the same r = 3.5 as in Fig. 1,
the panels of Fig. 2 summarize our main findings. The first
panel shows the fractions of strategies in the final state in de-
pendence of the punishment fine α when different punishing
strategies fight against defectors simultaneously. For clarity,
we have also plotted the accumulated fraction of punishing
strategies. In contrast to the uniform punishing model, we
can see that the total fraction of cooperators should increase
monotonously with increasing α. As Fig. 2(a) illustrates, co-
operators can survive when α > 0.40, and become dominant
over α ≥ 0.42 (see also the enlarged part in Fig. 2(c)). We
should stress, however, that not all types of cooperators can
survive at equilibrium, even if cooperators take over the whole
population. It turned out that there are some “weak” classes
of cooperators who go extinct before defectors die out, while
other classes of cooperators survive.
For a more in-depth explanation, the vitality of punishing
classes can be estimated if we let them fight against defectors
individually. The outcomes of this scenario are summarized
in Fig. 2(b). Results presented in this panel suggest that there
are punishing classes who can dominate for all high α values,
while others become vulnerable as we increase α. More inter-
estingly, however, there are mildly punishing strategies who
can survive only due to the support of the more successful
punishing strategies. For example, for α = 0.42 classes C5
and C4 can outperform defectors, while C3 disappear when
they fight against defectors individually [Fig. 2(b) and (c)].
But when all punishing strategies are on the stage then C3
players can survive as well. This effect is more spectacular
for the second-order free riding C0 class, who would die out
immediately at such a low synergy factor r if they face defec-
tors alone. But now, especially at high α values, their ratio
becomes considerable. This indicates that some less viable
classes of cooperators can survive because of the support of
more viable punishing strategies via an evolutionary selection
mechanism which has a biased impact on the evolution of oth-
erwise competing strategies.
To demonstrate the underlying mechanism behind the
above observations, we present a series of snapshots of strat-
egy evolutions starting from different prepared initial states.
The comparative analysis is plotted in Fig. 3, where all runs
were obtained for α = 0.42 and r = 3.5. In the first row,
we demonstrate how the class of C5 punishing strategy can
prevail over defectors. Initially, only a tiny portion of C5 co-
operators is launched in the sea of defectors [the fraction of
C5 is 8%, see panel (a)]. Still, C5 cooperators can expand
gradually and invade the whole available territory [shown in
panels from (a2) to (a4)]. The second row, which was taken
at the same parameter values, demonstrates clearly the vul-
nerability of the C3 class against defectors. Despite of the
fact that they occupy the majority of the available room at
the beginning, shown in panel (b1), still, they will be gradu-
ally crowded out by defector players. The final state, shown
in panel (b4), highlights that such a rare punishment activity
represented by C3 class is ineffective against defectors at the
applied synergy factor r. The third row, where all previously
mentioned strategies are present at the beginning, illustrates a
completely different scenario. Here we start from a balanced
initial state where half of the lattice sites is occupied by C3
and C5 strategies, while the other half is filled by defectors.
As panels (c1) to (c4) illustrate, defectors will gradually go
extinct while “weak” C3 cooperators survive and occupy al-
most half of the available territory in the final state. We note
that there is a neutral drift between punishing strategies in the
absence of defectors, which will result in a homogeneous state
where the probability to arrive to one of the possible final des-
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Evolution of typical spatial patterns, as
obtained for four different prepared initial conditions when using
α = 0.42 and r = 3.5. The first row shows the case when just
a few C5 cooperators are initially present among defectors. It can
be observed that even under such unfavorable initial conditions the
C5 strategy can successfully outperform defectors. The second row
feature a similar experiment with the C3 strategy, which fails to sur-
vive among defectors even though the latter are initially in minority.
The third row illustrates cooperation among strategies C3 and C5,
which together dominate the whole population even thoughC3 alone
would fail under the same conditions (see second row). We note that
a neutral drift starts when defectors die out, as explained in the main
text. The fourth row demonstrates, however, that the cooperation
among different punishing strategies illustrated in the third row is
rather fragile. If initially the strategy C3 is replaced by strategy C2,
then the later simply die out and subsequently the whole evolution
becomes identical to the one shown in the first row, where strategy
C5 alone outperforms all defectors. For clarity, here the employed
system size is small with just L× L = 100× 100 players.
tinations is proportional to the initial portion of a specific class
at the time defectors die out [44]. This evolutionary outcome
indicates that although C3 players are, as an isolated strategy,
weak against defector players, they can nevertheless survive
because of the assistance of the strong C5 strategy even if the
initial fraction of the later is modest. In the fourth row, how-
ever, when we arrange a similar setup but replaced weak C3
players with also weak C2 players, the final state will always
be the full C5 state. Here, the presence of strong C5 players
does not yield a relevant support to C2 players who therefore
die out, and subsequently the system returns to the scenario
illustrated in panels (a1) to (a4).
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Individual competition of three different pun-
ishing strategies, namely C2, C3 and C5, against defectors in de-
pendence on time. Note that initially only one cooperative strategy
and defectors are present, using the same initial conditions as illus-
trated in Fig. 3. Positive value of ρCi − ρD indicates the invasion
of cooperator strategy while its negative value suggests invasion to
the reversed direction. Note that while both C2 and C3 strategies
ultimately loose their battle, the latter is able to prevail significantly
longer. This enables an effective help of strategy C5 when they com-
pete against defectors together, as illustrated in panels (c1) to (c4) in
Fig. 3.
The key point, which explains the significantly different tra-
jectories for mildly punishing strategies is based on the dif-
ference of invasion velocities between the competing strate-
gies. To demonstrate the importance of invasion velocities, we
monitor how the fraction of strategies evolves in time when
we launch the system from a two-strategy state where both
strategies form compact domains. Following the previously
applied approach illustrated in Fig. 3, we compare the strat-
egy invasions between C2−D, C3−D, and between C5−D
strategies. The comparison of these different cases is plotted
in Fig. 4. As expected, both C2 and C3 loose the lonely fight
against defectors, while C5 will eventually crowd out defec-
tors. Note that there is only a very slight increase during the
early stages of the evolutionary process that can be observed
for all cases, independently of the final outcome. This is be-
cause straight initial interfaces can provide a strong tempo-
rary phalanx for every punishing strategy. Nevertheless, when
this interface becomes irregular due to invasions the individ-
ual weakness ofC2 andC3 strategies reveals itself. Still, there
is a significant difference between their trajectories. Namely,
strategy C3 is able to resist for a comparatively long time,
which gives strategy C5 enough time to crowd out defectors.
On the other hand, strategy C2 is a too easy prey for defec-
tors, which is why they die out faster than the strategy C5 is
able to eliminate all defectors. Ultimately thus, strategy C3
can benefit from cooperation with strategy C5, while strategy
C2 is unable to do the same.
In the remainder of this work, we focus on the parameter
region where cooperators are able to coexist with defectors
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Stationary fractions of different cooperator classes in dependence on α when they compete against defectors simultane-
ously [panel (a)] and individually [panel (b)]. The cumulative fraction of all punishing strategies (denoted as C in the legend) is also plotted.
The multiplication factor in both panels is r = 4.0, which enables pure cooperators (C0) to coexist with defectors even in the absence of
punishment.
without applying punishment. Namely, if the synergy factor
exceeds r > 3.74, then pure cooperators (cooperators that do
not punish) can survive permanently alongside defectors due
to network reciprocity [43]. Evidently, the presence of pun-
ishers can of course still elevate the overall cooperation level
and defectors can be effectively crowded out from the popu-
lation [23]. Here the main question is thus how the different
punishing strategies will share the available space.
The results are summarized in the left panel of Fig. 5, as
obtained for the representative value of r = 4.0. It can
be observed that, when all the different types of punishing
strategies fight against defectors simultaneously, then coop-
erators can dominate the whole population above a thresh-
old value α > 0.25. However, to evaluate these final out-
comes adequately, we need to know the individual relations
between each particular cooperative strategy and defectors on
a strategy-versus-strategy basis. Therefore, as for the previ-
ously presented low r case in Fig. 2, in the right panel of Fig. 5
we also show the stationary fractions of different cooperators
classes when they compete against defectors individually. Re-
sults presented in panel (b) highlight that too large α values
could be detrimental for the C3, C4 and the C5 strategy. This
is the so-called “punish, but not too hard” effect, where too
large costs of sanctioning do more damage to those that ex-
ecute punishment than the imposed fines do damage to the
defectors [9]. A direct comparison with the results presented
in panel (a) demonstrates clearly that we can observe a similar
cooperation among punishing strategies as we have reported
before for the low r case, in particular because all the men-
tioned mildly punishing strategies can survive even at a high
α value.
On the other hand, a conceptually different mechanism can
be observed in the small α region, which is reminiscent of
what one would actually expect from a selection process.
More specifically, panel (a) of Fig. 5 shows that at α ≈ 0.2
only strategy C3 survives and coexists with D while all the
other punishing strategies die out. The latter players are those,
who could survive individually with defectors but should die
out because of the presence of a more effective (C3) strat-
egy. Interestingly, the mentioned selection mechanism can
work most efficiently when the leading strategy is less effi-
cient against defectors. Right panel of Fig. 5 shows that C3
would be unable to crowd out strategy D at these α values,
while a D-free state could be obtained at higher α value. In
the latter case, when C3 is too powerful, then this strategy
beats defectors too fast which allows other punishing strate-
gies to survive: this is similar to what we have observed in the
third row of Fig. 3. But when C3 is less effective at smaller
α values then the presence of surviving D players enables C3
players to play out their superior efficiency if comparing to
other punishing strategies. Thus, depending on the key pa-
rameter values, most prominently the multiplication factor r
and the punishment fine α, the different punishing strategies
can either cooperate with each other or compete against each
other in the spatial public goods game.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have introduced and studied multiple types of punishing
strategies that sanction defectors with different probabilities.
The fundamental question that we have addressed is whether
there exists a selection mechanism which would result in an
unambiguous victor when these strategies compete against de-
fectors. We have shown that the answer to this question de-
pends sensitively on the external conditions, in particular on
the value of the multiplication parameter r. If the public goods
game is demanding due to a low value of r, then the pure
payoff-driven individual selection provides a helping hand to
those punishing strategies that would be unable to survive in
an individual competition against defectors. In particular, we
have demonstrated that the failure or success of a specific pun-
ishing strategy could depend sensitively on the relation of in-
vasion velocities between specific punishing strategies and the
6defectors. Accordingly, if the loosing punishing strategy can
delay the complete victory of defectors sufficiently long, then
a more successful punishing strategy has a chance to wipe out
defectors first. This is an example of the cooperation between
different punishing strategies.
On the other hand, in a less demanding environment, char-
acterized by a higher multiplication factor, a different kind of
relation can emerge. While the previously summarized co-
operation between punishing strategies is still possible, there
also exist parameter regions where competition is the dom-
inant mode, and indeed there is always a single and unam-
biguous victor among the different classes of punishers. In-
terestingly, we have shown that this happens when the fittest
punishing strategy is not effective enough to beat defectors
completely. Instead, by carefully taming the defectors, they
help to reveal the advantages of other punishing strategies.
As we have shown, the key point here is again the relation
between the invasion velocities. Namely, a too intensive in-
vasion will decimate defectors too fast and the advantage of
specific punishing classes will remain forever hidden. There-
fore, in contrast to intuitive expectation, the social diversity of
cooperators in terms of their relations with defectors could be
the result of an effective selection mechanism. We hope that
this research will contribute relevantly to our understanding
of the emergence of diversity among competing strategies, as
well to their role in determining the ultimate fate of the popu-
lation.
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